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BEYOND THE QUAGMIRE: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF RESIDENTS OF
PRIVATE SHELTERS FOR THE HOMELESS
DOUGLAS H. LASDON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Covenant House is a shelter for homeless and runaway
youths, located on West Forty-first Street in Manhattan. With
Covenant House's open-intake policy, and the typical exposure
of runaways to street crime, fugitive children periodically come
to the shelter. Because the police have at times also come to
Covenant House seeking such fugitives, the fourth amendment
rights of Covenant House minors and group shelter residents
should be delineated to protect what may be their only refuge of
privacy.
Covenant House itself consists of two connected buildings
opening onto a courtyard that borders a main street. Round-the-
clock security guards patrol the Covenant House area, and in-
quire into the business of any visitor. Two doors are available to
residents, one opens onto the courtyard and another, usually
open only during lunchtime, is at the rear of the complex. Build-
ing "A" has one floor for reception, two floors of residential
housing, and five floors of administrative offices. Building "B"
contains three floors of residential housing, and two floors of as-
sorted services.
A residential floor usually houses between twenty and forty
residents. Private rooms are available to about twenty-five mi-
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nors, and when the rooms are full, the couches in the lounge
area are used for sleeping. Each resident without a room is given
a locker. The keys to the rooms and the lockers are held exclu-
sively by staff members who are always present.
A shelter such as Covenant House is unlike most private or
public areas encountered in fourth amendment jurisprudence. In
this article the Covenant House shelter is used as a model for
examining the fourth amendment as it applies to residents of a
shelter.
The most compelling observation confronting one after
study of the law of search and seizure is the glaring lack of clar-
ity and consistency in United States Supreme Court decisions.1
This is unfortunate because clear and easily applicable stan-
dards are crucial to lawful police responses to the myriad and
tension-filled dramas the police face daily. The confusion is
somewhat understandable, however, when seen in the light cast
1. Justice Harlan in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), observed that
"state and federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite
intolerable the present state of uncertainty" in the law of search and seizure. Id. at 490
(Harlan, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Clark in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961) stated:
Every moment of every day, somewhere in the United States, a law enforce-
ment officer is faced with the problem of search and seizure. He is anxious to
obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It is the duty of this
Court to lay down those rules with such clarity and understanding that he may
be able to follow them. For some years now the field has been muddy, but today
the Court makes it a quagmire.
Id. at 622 (Clark, J., dissenting). See generally LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the
Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the Quagmire, 8 CraM. L. BULL. 9 (1972). Profes-
sor Amsterdam presents a delightful analogy comparing the Supreme Court to Pythia,
the priestess of the Oracle of Delphi. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970). His point is that Supreme
Court decisions, because practical application is left to others (judicial and police of-
ficers) and such a few number of cases actually reach the Court, have a limited effect:
According to Par Lagerkvist, the role of the Pythia or priestess of the Oracle
at Delphi was of incomparable grandeur and futility. This young maiden was
periodically locked to a tripod above a noisome abyss, where her god dwelt and
from which nauseating odors rose and assaulted her. There, the god entered her
body and soul, so that she thrashed madly and uttered inspired incomprehensi-
ble cries. The cries were interpreted by the corps of professional priests of the
oracle, and their interpretations were, of course, for mere mortals the words of
the god. The Pythia experiences incalculable ecstasy and degradations; she was
viewed with utmost reverence and abhorence; to her every utterance, enormous
importance attached; but, from the practical point of view, what she said did not
matter much.
Id. at 785-86.
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by the direct conflict between two vital policies: the individual's
right to be free from arbitrary governmental intrusion, and soci-
ety's need for effective law enforcement.2 The clash of these
weighty values, ubiquitous in fourth amendment analysis, makes
the accommodation demanded between them highly trouble-
some, if not impossible, to attain. This difficulty is enhanced by
the inevitable change in perceptions that comes with the turno-
ver in Supreme Court membership.
The most well established and oft-repeated fourth amend-
ment rule is that "the entry into a home to conduct a search or
make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
unless done pursuant to a warrant."' This strict requirement
grew out of strong colonial opposition to the infamous writs of
2. See People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 330 N.E.2d 631, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677
(1975) where the court said: "Since colonial times it has been the task of the
courts to reconcile the dichotomy between effective law enforcement and indi-
vidual rights. Our courts have frequently grappled with these often antithetical
interests in a myriad of situations." Id. at 555, 330 N.E.2d at 635, 369 N.Y.S.2d
at 681. The Court stated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
that:
the basic purpose of (the Fourth Amendment) as recognized by countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is "basic to a free
society."
Id. at 528. See also Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1964), where the author characterizes the dichotomy between efficiency in crime preven-
tion and privacy of the individual as two models of criminal procedure: the crime control
model and the due process model. Id. at 9-23.
3. Steagald v. United States, 449 U.S. 819 (1981). See also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Section 12 of Article I of the New York Constitution is identical, "and this identity
of language supports a policy of uniformity in both state and federal courts." People v.
Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 161, 429 N.E.2d 735, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
This article is concerned primarily with the fourth amendment rights of the U.S.
Constitution. Except for occasional references to New York state law, state protections
are not considered. Although state law may not act to decrease federal constitutional
protections, states may independently offer increased protections from government
interference.
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assistance.' Outside of a "few specially established and well-de-
lineated exceptions, '" a warrantless search or arrest inside a
home is impermissible and the fruits of the search will be sup-
pressed at trial. In reality, however, very little of fourth amend-
ment law comports with this glib statement. These "exceptions,"
with increasing frequency, account for the precipitating force be-
hind police searches and seizures.7 The basic warrant require-
ment is also subject to many subtle and varied distinctions.
These difficulties are compounded when they are applied to pri-
vate shelters. Shelters do not comfortably fit into any of the
usual settings ruled on by the courts; it is neither a typical home
nor a public space. Thus, several interesting and perplexing
questions of first impression arise upon a study of the issues.
Many "categories" of jurisprudence that are delineated and
separated in this article are really amorphous, spilling into one
another, and necessitating an awareness that no subject of
fourth amendment law exists in a vacuum. The article discusses,
in the order listed, the following topics: general issues involved
in the application of the fourth amendment; areas protected by
4. These writs allowed a customs official to "enter and go into any house, shop, cellar,
warehouse or room or other place, and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests,
trunks and other packages there to seize and from thence to bring, or any kind of goods
or merchandise whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." 13-17 Charles II c. II, c. 11 §§
IV, V. See also 0. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at
208 (1951): "The evidence indicates that it was the use made of the incidental provisions
of (the revenue acts) to attack fundamentally the liberty and property of Americans that
in six short years transformed thousands of loyal British subjects into active revolution-
ists." Id. at 208. William Pitt in a Parliamentary debate eloquently exhibited the pas-
sions behind the movement to restrict the police:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). See also N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-78
(1937); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 141-45 (1970); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-9 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.20 (Mc-
Kinney 1984).
7. Indeed, Professor LaFave, perhaps the foremost commentator on fourth amend-
ment law, has expressed the fear that the exceptions are swallowing the rule. See
LaFave, supra note 1.
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the fourth amendment; the warrant requirement; exceptions to
the warrant requirement; and searches by Covenant House
officials.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Application of the Fourth Amendment to Juveniles
The initial and most fundamental hurdle to clear in as-
sesssing the rights of Covenant House residents is the extent to
which the fourth amendment applies to juveniles. The Supreme
Court, in the watershed case In re Gault,' recognized that a ju-
venile offender who faces possible incarceration is deprived of
liberty and thus entitled to some due process protection.' The
Court made clear, however, that the announced safeguards 0
were directed toward the adjudicatory stage of proceedings
only." Moreover, the Court reiterated its earlier statement in
Kent v. United States12 that in adjudicatory hearings, only
those rights required by notions of fundamental fairness and
due process under the fourteenth amendment would apply. 3 To
this date the Supreme Court has refused to consider whether al-
leged juvenile offenders are entitled to full fourth amendment
protection.
1 4
Nonetheless, lower courts have extended Gault to its logical
conclusion, providing due process rights at all stages of the juve-
nile process.' 5 New York state court decisions indicate that
8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. The four due process requirements announced in Gault were the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to notice, and the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 31-57.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13.
12. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13. Id. at 562.
14. See David Levell W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043 (1980), denying cert. to In re
David W., 103 Cal. App. 3d 469, 163 Cal. Rptr. 87 (deleted on direction of Supreme
Court by order dated July 18, 1980). In dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari,
Justice Marshall stated that "this Court has never considered the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections when asserted by a minor." Id. at 1046.
15. The Supreme Court has held that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is
required in delinquency proceedings where a child is charged with an act that if commit-
ted by an adult would be a crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The law of double
jeopardy is applicable to juvenile proceedings, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). But
see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right to jury trial is not constitution-
19861
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some, if not complete, fourth amendment rights are accorded
minors in juvenile proceedings. The strongest statement so far
has been made in In re Williams.16 In Williams the family court,
using a due process and fair treatment analysis, concluded that
juveniles should be protected at least to the extent of adults:
After much reflection I am persuaded that the "require-
ments of due process and fair treatment" demand that
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures be extended to children charged
with the doing of any act which if done by an adult
would be a crime, and that a Family court ought to be no
less zealous than a criminal court in requiring reality of
consent, freely and intelligently given without fear of co-
ercion before permitting contraband discovered as the re-
sult of a search without a warrant to be used against
them in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Indeed, be-
cause of the child's tender years and lack of understand-
ing of his constitutional rights even more rigorous stan-
dards than those applied to adults should prevail when it
is claimed that a child has knowingly waived a constitu-
tional right.
17
In several other decisions New York courts, without discussing
rationale, have tacitly assumed the full application of the fourth
amendment to juveniles: In re Ronny,"a (consent); In re Lang,'
(stop and frisk); Kwok T. v. Mauriello,20 (exigent circum-




Probable cause defines the quantum of proof that a state
official must have before he or she is entitled to search or seize;
it is a fundamental requirement for a reasonable search under
ally required in delinquency proceedings).
16. 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966).
17. Id. at 169, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
18. 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fain. Ct., Queens Co. 1963).
19. 44 Misc. 2d 900, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965).
20. 43 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (1977). The court stated: "In the absence
of a valid search warrant, governmental intrusion into the privacy of the home is, with
certain limited exceptions, prohibited by constitutional limitations."
21. 40 A.D. 2d 638, 336 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Term. 1st Dep't 1972).
[Vol. III
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the fourth amendment.22 Except for consensual searches or ar-
rests, no search or seizure can pass constitutional muster with-
out probable cause. More than any other of the numerous facets
of fourth amendment law, the probable cause requirement rep-
resents a compromise for accommodating two opposing interests,
that of crime prevention and detection, with that of individual
privacy and security.23 The inherent vagueness of the probable
cause standard makes principled analysis in the streets, as well
as in the courts, nearly impossible.
For probable cause to arrest a person there must be suffi-
cient evidence that (1) a violation of the law has been commit-
ted, and (2) the person arrested committed the violation. 4 For
probable cause to search particular premises there must be suffi-
cient evidence that (1) the specific items to be searched for are
connected with criminal activity, and (2) these items will be
found in the place to be searched.2 5 "[I]ssuance of a warrant is a
discretionary act based upon a finding of probable cause as a
result of certain information given to a magistrate" under oath,
and thus, a reviewing court passes on this exercise of discretion
only in light of the information submitted to the magistrate.26
An arrest cannot be justified by what a subsequent search dis-
closes.2 7 Also, an aggrieved party challenging an affidavit sub-
mitted for a warrant must demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence either a deliberate misrepresentation of the truth
or a reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant, and that the
untruthful information was necessary for establishing probable
22. The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures as well as
requiring probable cause before a warrant shall issue. See supra note 3. In the cases in
which a warrant is not required, "unreasonable" is equivalent to "lacking probable
cause."
23. The tension in the administration of the probable cause requirement is between
processing the highest number of criminals and protection of individuals by limiting offi-
cial power. See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 4, at 149-50. See also
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959): "Under our system, suspicion is not
enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment
teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest."
24. KAMISAR, LAFAVE, & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 268 (1980).
25. Id.
26. People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 130, 303 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (1969).





Probable cause is present where "the facts and circum-
stances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is [being] committed. ' 29 Exactly how
probable any evidence must be before there is "probable cause"
is not clear. The Supreme Court, however, has sent signals indi-
cating that probability must approach fifty percent. In Mallory
v. United States,0 information that a rape had been committed
by a masked black man was insufficient to arrest three black
men who had access to the scene of the rape."1 Also, in Wong
Sun v. United States,82 the Court held improper the arrest of
several people with the same nickname as the suspect."3
The probable cause requirement is often the factor upon
which a fourth amendment case is decided. Although, because of
the fact specific nature of the determination, rules for when
probable cause is present or absent are nearly impossible to
make, a list of cases dealing with the issue can give a flavor for
when probable cause is established: Henry v. United States,8
4
(no probable cause where defendant's partner was implicated,
but not suspected, and the two were seen loading and delivering
unidentifiable cartons); People v. Plevy,3 5 (probable cause exists
where statements by defendant's father, neighbors, as well as in-
dependent police investigations showed that defendant was seen
carrying and surreptitiously hiding victim's clothing); People v.
Sciacca,86 (no probable cause for search by officer who had only
a second-hand anonymous tip that the truck used in a burglary
28. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 264
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
29. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1960). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), where the
Court referred to the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. "Common rumor or re-
portsuspicious or even 'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant
for arrest. And that principle has survived to this very day." Id. at 100.
30. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
31. Id.
32. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
33. Id.
34. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
35. 52 N.Y.2d 58, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1980).
36. 78 A.D.2d 545, 432 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1980).
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was in a certain garage37); People v. Esposito,3 8 (no probable
cause where police merely had a suspicion that airport baggage
loaders were involved in thefts of outgoing and incoming passen-
gers' luggage); People v. Ponder,3 9 (probable cause exists where
serious crime committed, a gun had been used, the defendant
had been seen running, his criminal background was known,40
and a bullet was seen outside his grandmother's home).
C. Consent
The police may make a constitutional warrantless search,
regardless of probable cause, if they receive the consent of the
individual whose premises, effects or person are to be searched.41
The consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and knowl-
edge of the right to refuse consent is only one factor to be con-
sidered and is not dispositive.42 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that a subjective test for voluntary consent must be met.
43
False claims of present authority 4 that are, used to gain en-
trance vitiate consent.
45
Consent is an important issue for Covenant House. Whose
consent would validate an otherwise unlawful search in such a
group shelter? A third party may consent to a search of an area
in which another has an expectation of privacy, when there is
"common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected. ' '46 It is not clear
whether apparent or actual authority is required, though in
37. Id.
38. 37 N.Y.2d 156, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1975).
39. 77 A.D. 223, 433 N.Y.S.2d 288 (4th Dept. 1980), affd., 54 N.Y.2d 160, 445
N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
40. Although a wide variety of information may contribute to the conclusion that
probable cause exists, the probative value of each piece of information must be carefully
weighed. The fact that a suspect has a criminal record may contribute toward the exis-
tence of probable cause, but his past record will never by itself establish probable cause.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
41. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
42. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), where the Court rejected
the requirement of a Miranda-like warning.
43. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Court addressed the
question if the consent was "in fact voluntary" (emphasis added).
44. As opposed to threats of future action.
45. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1969).
46. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 164 (1974).
19861
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
Stoner v. California,47 the Supreme Court, invalidating consent
by a hotel clerk, declared "the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment are not to be eroded. . . by unrealistic doctrines of
'apparent authority.' ",4" Consent by minors (or residents), be-
cause of their inferior interest, is most likely insufficient to allow
a search of the premises. 9
Rules regulating valid consent by employees are by no
means set and clear. Courts typically attempt to assess and eval-
uate the employment responsibilities of the employee with re-
gard to the search being challenged.50 Thus, in United States v.
Block,51 although the employee was left in sole charge of the
store, his age (20 years old) and status (handyman) acted to viti-
ate the consent.5 2 Similarly, in United States v. Lagow, 3 the
court held a clerk's consent to search the corporation's premises
insufficient.5 ' These cases indicate that consent by Covenant
House employees, such as receptionists and child-care workers
(lacking administrative authority), would not be upheld in court.
Any argument to the contrary must be based on the questiona-
ble doctrine of apparent authority."'
D. Standing
Another fourth amendment rule that is troublesome in anal-
ysis is that of the standing required to raise a constitutional
claim. The doctrine of "standing" holds that a particular de-
fendant may move to exclude from a criminal trial impermissi-
bly seized evidence only if his or her own constitutional rights
were violated.56 That is, a defendant has no right to exclude evi-
dence just because somebody's rights were violated. This doc-
47. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
48. Id. at 488.
49. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 736-38 (1978).
50. Id. at 767-70.
51. 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
52. Id.
53. 66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
54. Id.
55. If the doctrine were accepted-and it might be merely as a way to avoid the
exclusionary rule-the circumstances as they objectively appeared to the police would
have to reasonably lead them to believe the employee actually had the authority to ad-
mit them.
56. The exclusionary rule never works to bar the arrest itself. See Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952).
[Vol. III
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trine is of great consequence in terms of remedies for residents
of shelters such as Covenant House. The standing doctrine al-
lows that even if the police unlawfully enter the Center, a resi-
dent without standing will be unable to move to suppress the
illegally seized evidence. The cases indicate that establishing
standing in a setting like Covenant House is an extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, task.
Abandoning the traditional entitlements to standing, the
Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois57 turned the inquiry, in ef-
fect, into a personalized expectation of privacy test.58 A defend-
ant may now seek to exclude evidence derived from a search or
seizure only if his or her legitimate expectation of privacy was
violated. 9 The ruling, therefore, restricts the opportunity for
challenging the propriety of searches and seizures. The Court
has found that an individual has no expectation of privacy, and
hence no standing to assert any fourth amendment violation, in
the following situations: by a car passenger in the glove compart-
ment or under the seat,60 by one friend in another friend's hand-
bag,"' by a customer in a briefcase belonging to an officer of his
bank, 2 by a defendant in the wire-tapped conversation of a co-
defendant, s nor by a son in his mother's apartment." New York
courts have closely followed the Supreme Court's guidance.
5
These decisions and their case-by-case approach have created
57. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Before Rakas, standing to assert a fourth amendment claim
was possessed by anyone who: (1) had a possessory interest in the premises searched; (2)
had a possessory interest in the items seized; or (3) was legitimately present at the scene
of the search.
58. Id. at 149.
'59. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S, 128 (1978). See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying
text for discussion of areas of constitutional protection and the general expectation of
privacy.
60. Id.
61. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
62. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
63. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
64. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
65. See People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981) (grandson has no
standing to assert improper search of grandmother's home at trial).
California, on the other hand, has extended standing to a defendant to assert the
fourth amendment violation of anyone. "If law enforcement officers are allowed to evade
the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its
deterrent effect is to that extent nullified." People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 655, 290 P.2d 855
(1955) (Traynor, J.).
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confusion. This jurisprudence is understandable only when
viewed against a backdrop of antipathy towards the exclusionary
rule by a majority of the court members."
The Rakas decision inextricably complicates fourth amend-
ment analysis for Covenant House residents. The difficulty of in-
dividualizing the expectation of privacy in a setting as diverse as
Covenant House is compounded by the current confusion in the
law.
7
Perhaps the only safe observation is that there is a trend
away from finding standing. The following sections assess the
likelihood of residents of shelters like Covenant House establish-
ing standing in various premises: (1) their own rooms and lock-
ers; (2) another's room or locker; (3) quasi-public areas (this in-
cludes all areas except offices, bedrooms and lockers); and (4) a
brief examination of the feasibility of the shelter as a corpora-
tion establishing standing.
1) Shelter Residents' Own Rooms and Lockers
There is a likelihood that a shelter resident can establish
standing to challenge a search of his or her own room or locker.
In McDonald v. United States," the Supreme Court protected a
boarder's right in his room in a boarding house. 9 Similarly, the
Court in Stoner v. California7 0 applied the fourth amendment
safeguards to a guest in his motel room,1 even though various
employees of the motel-maids, busboys, etc.-had access to the
66. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137-38:
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial cost for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept
from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected . . . . Since
our cases generally have held that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are vio-
lated may successfully suppress evidence obtained in the course of an illegal
search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons
who may invoke the rule are properly considered when deciding whether to ex-
pand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations.
67. Professor LaFave has commented that "the Supreme Court has addressed the
Fourth Amendment issue on a number of occasions, but in the eyes of some in a not
entirely consistent fashion." LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 544.
68. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
69. Id. at 456.
70. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
71. In another case, United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1981), the
government conceded that each defendant had standing to challenge the search of his
own person and motel room and the seizure of evidence from such searches.
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rooms.7 2 These decisions make much sense and should be fol-
lowed for Covenant House residents. Not only are the bedrooms
not public in the way the hallways and lounges are, but they
represent the last, and perhaps only, enclave of privacy for their
occupants."
2) Other Shelter Residents' Rooms or Lockers
A resident of a shelter will most likely not be able to estab-
lish standing to challenge searches in other residents' rooms or
lockers based upon current law. The Supreme Court in Rawl-
ings7' held that the defendant did not have an expectation of
privacy in his friend's handbag because he did not have a right
to exclude others from the handbag." Similarly, in Alderman
7 6
the Court found no standing by a son to challenge the search
and seizure in his mother's apartment because it was his mother
who held the right to exclude others.7 In United States v. Han-
sen,7 8 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the
question with regard to a guest in a friend's hotel room .7 The
court declared:
Assuming that Means had an ownership or possessory in-
terest in the key, there is no indication that he took any
precautions to maintain his privacy to the key. It was
found in a room from which he demonstrated no rights to
exclude others. Since Means has not shown that his rea-
sonable expectations of privacy were violated by the
search of Hansen's room 241, we hold that Means cannot
challenge that search or the seizure of the key to his
room, 242.80
72. 376 U.S. at 488-89.
73. But see People v. Van Buren, 87 A.D.2d 900 (3rd Dep't 1982), where the court
refused standing to a guest in his room in his friend's apartment. See also United States
v. Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court refused standing to chal-
lenge an illegal action in a drop house shared with fifty other people.
74. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
75. Id. at 104.
76. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
77. See also People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
78. 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1981).




According to the logic of these cases, because Covenant House
residents have no rights with respect to other residents' rooms or
lockers, they would not be permitted to challenge searches in
them.
3) Quasi-Public Areas
It is highly doubtful that a resident or staff member would
be able to establish standing in any of the quasi-public areas
(this includes all areas except offices and bedrooms) in the com-
plex. The essentially free reign given to residents and staff to
wander about the building makes finding a privacy interest un-
likely, especially given the restrictive notions of privacy by the
courts. In United States v. Agapito,1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit compared the privacy interests
in homes and motels:
But a transient occupant of a motel must share corridors,
sidewalks, yards, and trees with other occupants. Granted
that a tenant has standing to protect the room he occu-
pies, there is nevertheless an element of public or shared
property in motel surroundings that is entirely lacking in
the enjoyment of one's home.8
2
4) Corporate Standing and Civil Actions
One interesting anomaly surfaces; a shelter such as Cove-
nant House is protected by the fourth amendment, yet, in most
areas of the facility, it appears that no one has standing to chal-
lenge improper searches and seizures. This riddle is resolved by
attributing standing to the owner (or lessee of the owner) of the
buildings-Covenant House. A present possessory interest in a
premise, even after Rakas, should be sufficient to support stand-
ing. "Under the Mancusi expectation-of-privacy test, as doubt-
less was true before, an individual with a present possessory in-
terest in the premises searched has standing to challenge that
81. 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980).
82. 620 F.2d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 1980), quoting United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d at
1052 (5th Cir. 1978). But see People v. Williams, 24 A.D.2d 274, 265 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st
Dep't 1965), where standing was accorded to the defendant in a common kitchen and
lounge area.
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search even though he was not present when the search was
made."8 3 Such standing is of no use to a resident defendant; it
has value only with regard to a civil action to recover damages
for unlawful searches or seizures.
It is clear that civil suits by corporate plaintiffs are permis-
sible, 4 and that corporations may assert fourth amendment
rights.8 5 Such suits may be brought on the corporation's own be-
half, or on behalf of its members."'
The standing cases draw dramatic attention to the impor-
tance of a shelter administrative policy that prohibits police
presence within the shelter complex. Despite the policy, case law
83. LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 545. See also Sokolov v. Villiage of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d
341, 438 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1981) where the property owner had standing to assert fourth
amendment rights in an empty apartment building.
Professor LaFave goes on to claim that the Rakas and Rawlings decisions should not
affect this rule:
This conclusion is not put into doubt by Rakas v. Illinois. . . . The Court
there only rejected the notion that a justified expectation of privacy would inevi-
tably arise out of being lawfully present, and noted that the defendants there
had not claimed any possessory interest in the place searched (there an automo-
bile). The Court stated in Rakas: "one of the main rights attaching to property
is the right to exclude others . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or
controls property will in likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by
virtue of this right to exclude."
Id. at 159-60 (1982 Pocket Part).
Professor LaFave distinguishes the Rawlings decision by noting that the Court de-
clared that the petitioner did not "have any right to exclude other persons from access to
Cox's purse." Id.
84. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Fulton Market Storage v. Cullerton,
582 F.2d 1071, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1978); Advocates for Arts v. Thompson, 532
F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); California Diversified Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974); Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Nassau County, 488 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1973).
85. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1973); Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 247 U.S. 333 (1936); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
395 (1920).
86. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); California Diversified Promotions v.
Musick, 505 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974). This concept of having corporate organizations
assert privacy interests of their members is by no means novel: Cal. Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (organization may assert constitutional rights of its mem-
bers); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (association-though a corpora-
tion-may assert on own behalf first amendment associational rights of members and
lawyers); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975) (association may assert rights of
others when seeking declaratory or injunctive relief); Comm. for Auto Responsibility v.
Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 998 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980) (list-
ing conditions for "associational standing").
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leads to the inevitable conclusion that evidence which is in fact
the fruit of an unlawful search will nonetheless still be admissi-
ble against a shelter individual as defendant in most instances.
The only available remedy to redress unlawful entries is a civil
action for damages.
III. AREAS PROTECTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment guarantees "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures ..8. The courts, however,
have not always agreed on which areas are protected against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.
In Katz v. United States,as the seminal case regarding
fourth amendment coverage, the Supreme Court held the Con-
stitution to be applicable whenever an individual harbors a justi-
fiable expectation of privacy, "what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
fourth amendment protection. . . .But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."89 Justice Harlan, in an oft-cited con-
currence, stated a two-pronged test for determining whether a
person is entitled to fourth amendment protection in a particu-
lar situation.90 The test requires "first, that a person have an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'rea-
sonable.'-1 This inquiry created an important battleground for
fourth amendment litigation.92
87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
88. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89. Id. at 351.
90. Id. at 361.
91. Id. But see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 56 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974), where the author questions the wisdom of the subjective prong: "the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by
announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that
we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." See
also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
enunciated his own doubts about this conception. "The analysis must, in my view, tran-
scend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk.
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present." Id. at 786.
92. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (phone calls in public booth pro-
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A. The Covenant House Complex
It is most likely that Covenant House, in its entirety, is
sheltered by the umbrella of fourth amendment protection. If
there is any doubt about this coverage, it is because of the quasi-
public nature of much of the complex. Although not open to the
general public, Covenant House shelters approximately 200 resi-
dents and employs 300 staff members. The exposure of certain
areas-lounges, cafeterias, hallways, clinics, etc.-to these peo-
ple potentially vitiates the expectation of privacy. Case law dem-
onstrates, however, that this is not a problem for coverage in the
first instance.
Business premises cases present the best analogy to Cove-
nant House for assessing fourth amendment protection." A
commercial facility, like Covenant House, is readily accessible to
large numbers of employees, yet closed to the general public.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that business and
commercial premises are entitled to protection from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. In See v. City of Seattle, 4 the Court
states, "[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has
a constitutional right to go about his business free from unoffi-
cial entries upon his private commercial property."'95
Other areas of the law also indicate that Covenant House is
covered by the fourth amendment. In McDonald v. United
tected from electronic surveillance); Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (corporation's use of open field to make visual readings of
smoke emissions permissible); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records
not protected); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1974) (phone numbers dialed not pro-
tected); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (business premises protected); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (reasonable expectation of a diminished scope accorded
prison inmates).
93. The hotel cases are not as analogous because of the general public invitation to
most areas within hotels.
94. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
95. Id. at 543. See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968), where the
Court declared: "This Court has held that the word 'houses', as it appears in the Amend-
ment, is not to be taken literally, and that the protection of the Amendment may be
extended to commercial premises."
In McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), a boarding house was held to be
protected. See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
Professor LaFave has observed that, "Not all business or commercial premises are
open to the public at large. A factory for example, may be readily accessible to the em-
ployees of the company, but it does not follow from this that police may enter those
premises at will. LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 340 (1978).
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States,6 the Supreme Court held that a room in a boarding
house was protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures,9 7 and in Stoner v. California,"8 the Court held hotel
rooms to be within the reach of the fourth amendment.99 In
Rush v. Obledo, 00 a federal district court in California was faced
with the question whether warrantless inspections of day-care
centers were permitted.10' Answering no, the court states "[t]o
subordinate the fundamental fourth amendment rights of many
thousands of day-care providers and other residents of their
homes . . . would be inconsistent with the priorities and values
established by the Constitution.' ' 12
Commercial premises that extend a general invitation to the
public, such as department stores, are not accorded the same
protection. "[A]s an ordinary matter, law enforcement officials
may accept a general public invitation to enter commercial
premises for purposes not related to the trade conducted there-
upon."'03 The actual practice of admitting people into the facil-
ity must be considered in determining the extent of the justified
expectation of privacy.1
0 4
At Covenant House there is no general invitation for public
admittance, and thus Covenant House maintains its expectation
of privacy. Unless specifically invited to Covenant House, secur-
ity guards question strangers and may turn individuals away.
Thus, the fourth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures are applicable to the Covenant House
setting.
96. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
97. Id.
98. 367 U.S. 483 (1964).
99. Id. at 490.
100. 517 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
101. Id. at 906.
102. Id. at 916.
103. United States v. Berret, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975), citing United States v.
Berkowitz, 429 F.2d 921, 925 (1st Cir. 1970).
104. LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 340. This explains why hallways and lobbies in hotels
and apartment buildings, which have free public access, are not protected from police
intrusions. Id. at 306-12.
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B. Rooms Exposed By Windows to the Public
Covenant House has several windows and glass doors that
allow outsiders a view of otherwise private areas; one window
faces the main street, a door exposes the reception area of one
building, and several windows and doors in the main reception
area (which is public) allow views into a lounge. Two distinct
problems are posed by this situation. First, what is the status of
things seen or heard, through the windows? Second, when are
police allowed to cross the threshold into the private areas be-
cause of discoveries through their senses?
Evidence gathered by a police officer situated in a public
place purely through unenhanced utilization of one or more
senses does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment.1 0 5 The mere viewing or hearing of criminal-
ity, however, does not give the officer the right to cross from a
public vantage point to a private one.'06 Thus, although what an
officer becomes aware of through a window of Covenant House is
admissible evidence against a resident, the officer does not have
the right, solely on the basis of such discovery, to enter the shel-
ter. It should be noted, however, that in most instances the
threat of the destruction or removal of evidence, or of the escape
of a suspect, or of the danger to life or property will justify a
police officer's entry into the private setting.
10 7
105. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Ortega, 471
F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Jaborda, 635 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. In Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), the Supreme Court overruled the
decision of the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Supreme Court had held
that a policeman standing at the door of a private room had no right to enter without a
warrant even after seing marijuana. The Supreme Court did not overrule based on this
rationale. Rather, it held that because the defendant was under arrest and inside the
room, the officer had a right to be in the room and hence could seize contraband in plain
view.
107. See infra notes 172-234 and accompanying text on exigent circumstances. See
also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), for an example of this situation.
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IV. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Arrest At Covenant House
1. The Major Cases
An important question for Covenant House is what type of
warrant, if any, is required for the police to enter the shelter
buildings to arrest a shelter resident. This question does not
lend itself to easy resolution; not only is there a dearth of re-
ported decisions concerning the type of warrant needed for ar-
rests, but the decisions that do address the problem are not eas-
ily applied to residences such as Covenant House. Nevertheless,
a review of the main pronouncements and their rationales indi-
cates that at minimum an arrest warrant is necessary, and a
sound argument can be made for requiring both an arrest war-
rant and a search warrant.
In United States v. Watson,10 8 the Supreme Court, in a 6-
2109 decision, held that a warrantless public arrest based on
probable cause did not run afoul of the Constitution.'10 Justice
Stewart, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Powell, em-
phasized that "[t]he Court does not decide, nor could it decide
in this case, whether or under what circumstances an officer
must obtain a warrant before he may lawfully enter a private
place to effect an arrest." '
In Payton v. New York,"' the Court partially answered the
108. 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (Defendant's warrantless felony arrest in a restaurant by
postal inspectors for possession of stolen credit cards did not violate fourth amendment
because there was probable cause for the arrest).
109. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision.
110. The Court explicitly referred to felony arrests in public. In 1970 New York abol-
ished any distinctions in arrest procedures for felonies and misdemeanors. According to
the practice commentary this was because, "the distinction between a felony and a mis-
demeanor is frequently fine and impossible of ascertainment at the time of arrest, espe-
cially with respect to degree crimes." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 140.10 (McKinney's Practice
Commentary, 1973). Although warrants were required for misdemeanor arrests under the
common law, the Supreme Court has never incorporated this rule into the Constitution
and it is unlikely that they will. See LAFAVE supra note 49, at 231-33.
111. 423 U.S. at 443.
112. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (Acting with probable cause but without warrant, police en-
tered the homes of two defendants without consent or exigent circumstances; the Su-
preme Court held that the fourth amendment, made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, prohibits police from making warrantless and nonconsensual en-
try into a suspect's home in order to make a felony arrest). A warrantless arrest made in
[Vol. III
BEYOND THE QUAGMIRE
question Justice Stewart alluded to in Watson. The Court held
an arrest warrant to be necessary, absent consent or exigent cir-
cumstances, to effect an arrest of a suspect in his or her own
home. " ' The Court reasoned that the "physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed"" 4 and "any differences in the intrusive-
ness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely ones of
degree rather than kind.""' Although an arrest warrant merely
documents probable cause that a suspect committed the
crime-a search warrant evidences probable cause that evidence
is in a particular place-the Court found the interposition of a
magistrate for an arrest warrant sufficient protection against un-
lawful intrusions into the home."" The arrest warrant entitles a
police officer to enter the suspect's dwelling only "when there is
reason to believe the suspect is within.""
7
In Steagald v. United States,'" the Supreme Court, in a 7-2
decision, held that police officers must obtain a search warrant,
absent consent or exigent circumstances, before searching a
third party's home for the person named in an arrest warrant
because an arrest warrant is inadequate to protect the fourth
amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant."'
The Court recognized that a magistrate's determination of prob-
able cause to believe that the object of a search is in a particular
violation of Payton will not prevent the defendant from being brought to trial. The prin-
cipal consequence of an invalid arrest is likely to be that evidence seized during the
arrest will not be admissible.
113. Id. at 599-601.
114. Id. at 585-86, citing United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972).
115. 445 U.S. at 589. The New York Court of Appeals based its opposite decision on
the "substantial difference" between an intrusion which attends a search of the premises
and one which attends an entry to arrest a suspect, the latter being less objectionable.
People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 310, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399-400, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228-29
(1980).
116. 445 U.S. at 602.
117. Id. at 603. Note that this determination is now made by the police officer.
118. 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (Federal drug enforcement agents searched the home of de-
fendant acting on a warrant to arrest another person. The individual named in the war-
rant was not found; however, the agents did find cocaine and other incriminating evi-
dence during the search).
119. The fourth amendment claim of the person named in the warrant had not been
raised. Therefore, the Court left open the question whether the subject of an arrese war-
rant can object to the absence of a search warrant when he is apprehended in another
person's home. Id. at 212.
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place is needed to safeguard an individual's interest in the pri-
vacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intru-
sion of the police.12 0 The Court perceived a dangerous potential
for abuse. "Armed solely with an arrest warrant for a single per-
son, the police could search all the homes of that individual's
friends and acquaintances."' 2' The Court addressed the practi-
cal problem of a mobile suspect forcing the police to make sev-
eral trips to a magistrate by pointing out that no warrant is
needed in a public place (the suspect may be seized entering or
leaving the third party premises), that the police need only an
arrest warrant in the suspect's own home, and that the exigent
circumstances doctrine is often available.'1
2
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, trying to minimize the im-
pact of Steagald, made an interesting and highly relevant obser-
vation concerning when a dwelling becomes a suspect's home for
fourth amendment purposes.
If a suspect has been living in a particular dwelling for
any significant period, say a few days, it can certainly be
considered his "home" for Fourth Amendment purposes,
even if the premises are owned by a third party and
others are living there, and even if the suspect concur-
rently maintains a residence elsewhere as well. In such a




Several questions of first impression are raised when these
principles are applied to shelters such as Covenant House. The
scenarios in these cases categorize the warrant requirement ac-
120. Id. at 216. The Court found an agent's personal determination of probable cause
inadequate protection from an illegal search, since an officer may lack the objectivity
necessary to correctly weigh "the strength of the evidence supporting the contemplated
action against the individual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of
his home." Id. at 212.
121. Id. at 215. Moreover, the Court expressed concern over the police using arrest
warrants for pretext searches. The Court also analogized the potential for abuse to the
horrors of the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was aimed at. Id. See supra note
4.
122. Id. at 221-22.
123. Id. at 230-31.
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cording to typical localities-public places and traditional
homes. Temporary shelters such as Covenant House do not fit
comfortably within the pronouncements of any of these cases.
Nevertheless, the rationales of the decisions are helpful in as-
sessing the posture of Covenant House shelters in the scheme of
fourth amendment treatment of dwellings. Two distinct ques-
tions need resolution. Is a shelter such as Covenant House a
home for Payton arrest purposes? If yes, is an arrest warrant
sufficient for entry, or does Steagald require a search warrant
also?
a) The Need For An Arrest Warrant
Covenant House shelters will most likely be considered a
home for Payton purposes. This conclusion may be arrived at
through two separate avenues. First, and most obvious, the
emergency shelter provided by residences such as Covenant
House can be directly analogized to a home. Second, the Watson
decision is specifically limited in scope to public places, with a
warrant required for any arrest where the subject has an expec-
tation of privacy.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly defined what is to
be a home for fourth amendment purposes. Several indicators,
however, point to an elastic concept. In Stoner v. California,
12
4
the Court equated homes and rooming houses with hotels. "No
less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a
boarding house. . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to consti-
tutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 2 5 Additionally, in his dissent in Steagald, Justice
Rehnquist has shown that he would consider any dwelling in
which an individual has lived for a few days a home for fourth
amendment purposes.'"" Also, one court has explicitly held with
regard to Payton that a family day-care home is to be afforded
124. 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
125. 376 U.S. at 490, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See also
United States v. Salmasian, 515 F. Supp. 685, 688 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), where the court
stated: "Also, I assume arguendo (but do not decide) that an individual inside a hotel
room is entitled to the same degree of protection from warrantless arrests as he would
have in his own home . ..."
126. See supra note 123.
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the same fourth amendment protections as a private home.127
New York courts have always equated homes and hotels for
fourth amendment purposes.128
It makes sense to treat a shelter such as Covenant House as
a home for fourth amendment purposes, even though it is an
institution that is providing temporary shelter. The services of-
fered-shelter, food, clothing, counseling, and medical care-are
all comforts found, in one way or another, in a traditional home.
More important, perhaps, is the crucial privacy interest of resi-
dents at shelters. Privacy is the special and cherished value of
the fourth amendment that supports the unique protection pro-
vided to the home. This privacy interest was given special recog-
nition in New York's Runaway and Homeless Youth Act,2 9 the
enabling legislation for Covenant House. The act, along with
other regulations, provides explicit safeguards for protecting the
identity of residents.8 0 Such state legislative concern should be
127. Rush v. Obledo, 517 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.Cal. 1981). A family day-care home is a
private home in which regular care is given to six or fewer children, plus any resident
children, for any part of a 24 hour day. The court held that the protections afforded to a
private home by the fourth amendment are in no way diminished by the fact that the
occupant of the home is paid to care for a few children from other families part of the
day.
128. See People v. Wood 31 N.Y.2d 975, 341 N.Y.S.2d 310, 293 N.E.2d 559 (1973);
People v. Brown, 77 A.D.2d 537, 430 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1980).
129. The N.Y. Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, Article 19-H, N.Y. EXEC. L. § 532-
b(1) (McKinney 1978) provides that "an approved runaway program is authorized to and
shall: . . . (e) assist in arranging for necessary services for runaway or homeless youth,
and where appropriate, their families, including but not limited to, food, shelter, cloth-
ing, medical care, and individual and family counseling."
130. The Act directs the New York State Division for Youth to enact regulations in
consultation with the department of Social Services "prohibiting the disclosure or trans-
ferral of any records containing the identity of individual youth receiving services." N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 532-d (4).
The division for youth in compliance with the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act of
1978, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 532-d (4), has enacted the required regulations. These regula-
tions explicitly define the obligation of confidentiality in dealing with young people
served in programs like Covenant House:
Disclosure or transferral of records or information containing the identity of
individual youth receiving services shall be prohibited, except as provided in sec-
tion 182-12(a) hereof.
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 182.6(6) (1986).
Approved runaway programs shall develop policies and procedures which
prohibit the disclosure or transferral to any individual or to any public or pri-
vate agency, without the written consent of the youth, of all information includ-
ing lists of names, addresses, photographs, and records of evaluations of individ-
uals served by the runaway program. All such information shall be kept
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of great weight in determining standards of reasonableness for
the protection of shelter residents under the fourth amendment.
The second approach to requiring a warrant for arrests
within Covenant House would be to limit Watson to arrests in
public places. If an arrest warrant is not required in private
places, a strong argument can be based on the glaring inconsis-
tency between the protection from seizures of property in pri-
vate places and seizures of people in private places. 13'
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both
searches and seizures, and since an arrest . . . is quintes-
sentially a seizure . . . the constitutional provision
should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it
does on searches. Indeed, [a strong] argument can be
made that the restrictions upon arrests . . . should be
greater. A search [causes] only . . . temporary inconve-
nience to the law-abiding citizen . . . (while an] arrest
• . . is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether
the person seized is [innocent or guilty].
1" 2
After presenting this argument in his concurrence in Watson,
Justice Powell indicates that "logic must defer to history and
experience"' ss in allowing different levels of protection from ar-
bitrary search and arbitrary arrest. In the same opinion, how-
ever, Justice Powell states that the Court has not considered
warrantless arrests in places where "the person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy."'" 4 Indeed, Justice Powell has left the
door open to bringing the fourth amendment within the bounds
of reason by allowing for the establishment of a principle which
requires an arrest warrant in places of privacy, but as with
confidential.
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9 § 182.12(a) (1986).
This explicit protection of confidentiality should also be helpful in arguing that Cov-
enant House, in its entirety, is covered by the fourth amendment. See infra notes 134-71
and accompanying text.
131. In Payton, the Court approvingly cited language in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). "Both sides to the controversy appear to recognize a distinc-
tion between searches and seizures that take place on a man's property-his home or
office-and those carried out elsewhere." 445 U.S. at 586 n.25.
132. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Justice Powell, concurring).
133. Id. at 429.
134. Id. at 433.
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searches, not in public.'"
b) The Need for a Search Warrant
If a shelter such as Covenant House is considered a home
for fourth amendment purposes, it is an open question whether
a search warrant is required along with an arrest warrant to
enter the shelter to make an arrest. Although Covenant House
may be classified hs the home of the subject of the arrest war-
rant, it is also the home for approximately two hundred others
not named in the warrant. The Supreme Court might readily de-
clare that because Covenant House is the home of the subject of
the arrest warrant, Payton controls and no search warrant is
necessary. Or the Court may just as readily hold that because
Covenant House is a home for many others, Steagald controls
and a search warrant is necessary. The underlying rationales of
the two decisions must therefore be carefully examined.
Consideration of the principles supporting the Steagald de-
cision indicates that the soundest approach is to require an ar-
rest warrant and a search warrant to enter Covenant House to
arrest a suspect. The Steagald Court was concerned with the po-
tential abuse to third parties' privacy interests and the possibili-
ties for searches conducted under pretext. If a search warrant is
not required, the fundamental and cherished privacy interest of
non-suspect residents of Covenant House would be precariously
balanced on a tightrope, ready at any moment to fall with the
onrush of zealous police officers. The police with the ubiquitous
bench warrant' 6 would be allowed free entry to bedrooms and
other chambers of privacy. Permitting police to search within
the complex without a search warrant would be tantamount to
the practice, severely criticized in Steagald, of allowing the
search of 300 homes in order to find one suspect. 3 7 The tran-
sient nature of the people at the shelter also makes any police
determination that a suspect is actually a resident always sub-
ject to serious question. "[Tlhe right protected-that of pre-
sumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from un-
135. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
136. A bench warrant is tantamount to an arrest warrant. People v. Ocasio, 106 Misc.
2d 138, 430 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1980). See also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §
1.20(28) and (30) for definitions of arrest warrant and bench warrant.
137. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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justified forcible intrusions by the Government-is weighty.' ' 38
Only a search warrant, with a neutral magistrate's determination
that probable cause exists to find a suspect in a particular place,
is sufficient to protect the rights of shelter residents and with-
stand a challenge under the fourth amendment.
The rationale of Payton does not undermine this approach.
Payton was an expansive decision with most of the analysis cen-
tered on distinguishing Watson and explaining why a warrant
was needed for an arrest in a home. Concern over the type of
warrant the police must have in order to enter a home for an
arrest was summarily treated. The Court, with little analysis,
simply stated that an arrest warrant justified requiring the sub-
ject to open the doors of his or her home to the police. The
Steagald Court picked up on the argument that did not move
the Payton Court-that an arrest warrant does not provide in-
surance that probable cause exists that a subject is in a particu-
lar place-and, perhaps, undermined Payton to the point of lim-
iting it to, at most, traditional homes.
B. Application, Issuance, and Execution
The law surrounding proper execution of warrants has spe-
cial importance for an institution such as Covenant House.
Strict procedures for dealing with police requests for admittance
must be developed. With the privacy of a large group of resi-
dents playing such an important role in their well being, it is
crucial to exclude any interference that disturbs the equilibrium
of the shelter.
1. Application and Issuance
The strict requirements of the warrant process find their or-
igin in the rocky history of the relationship between the state,
through its police officers, and individual citizens. It is precisely
the warrant application and issuance process that is supposed to
provide the final safeguard for privacy. Interposition of a magis-
trate is meant to bring a rational force into an often chaotic and
emotional situation. This point was most eloquently stated by
Justice Jackson in the now-famous passage from Johnson v.




The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en-
forcement the support of the usual inferences which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is . . .a grave concern, not only
to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell
in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement
agent.839
In New York, a police officer seeking a warrant must put the
facts establishing probable cause into a signed, written affida-
vit. 40 For a nighttime search, this affidavit must assert probable
cause to believe that the search warrant cannot be executed be-
tween 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m., or that the property will be re-
moved or destroyed if not seized forthwith. '4 No such time limi-
tations exist for arrest warrants.'"
A warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached judicial
officer or magistrate.'4 3 Search warrants must describe the prop-
erty and place, and must state the allowable execution time, and
139. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). In McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948), Justice Douglas put it more starkly: "[p]ower is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted." See also The Virginia Declaration
of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be com-
manded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to
seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly de-
scribed and supported by evidence are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to
be granted.
Quoted in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
140. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 1981).
141. Id., § 690.30 (McKinney 1984).
142. Id., § 120.80 (McKinney 1981).
143. Id., § 120.10. In Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), the Court invalidated
a state provision that granted $5.00 to the magistrate every time a warrant was issued.
See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971).
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whether entry without notice of authority and purpose is al-
lowed. 44 Arrest warrants must state the offense and identity of
the defendant, unless the identity is unknown, in which case a
description by which the individual can be identified with rea-
sonable certainty will suffice.' The warrant must be addressed
to a police officer whose scope of authority embraces the county
of issuance.1
46
The fourth amendment requires that a warrant have a par-
ticular description of the premises to be searched and the item
to be seized.14 For shelters such as Covenant House, the ques-
tion is whether a warrant that does not particularize a specific
area in the buildings of the Center is lawful. Search warrants for
apartments or hotels have been held invalid if the warrants
failed to describe the particular subunit to be searched with suf-
ficient definiteness to preclude indiscriminate searches of one or
more subunits."48 It is unlikely, however, that these cases will
have a major impact on searches in Covenant House. The ration-
ale of these decisions is based upon the fact that in most multi-
ple-occupancy buildings it is not typical that the criminality
under question has access to all of the separate living
144. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.45 (McKinney 1984). See infra notes 130-143 and
accompanying text for discussion of the notice of authority and purpose requirement.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court stated that a warrant
should be drafted so that the search is limited in scope and is no more intrusive than it
must be. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), where the Court held that
persons and things to be searched under a warrant must be particularly described.
145. N.Y. CalM. PRoc. LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1981).
146. Id., §§ 690.25 (McKinney 1984), 120.10 (McKinney 1981). The arrest warrant
may be addressed to classifications of police officers. Failure to follow the New York
procedural requirements will result in suppression of the fruits of the search. See id., §
710.20 (McKinney 1984). In People v. Kennedy, 75 Misc.2d 10, 347 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y.
Co. Ct. 1973), the court suppressed evidence obtained because of the failure of a wiretap
order to comply with the state minimalization requirement.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See United States v. Higgins, 428 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.
1970); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). The particular description requirement
has a certain elasticity to it. "Technical requirements of elaborate specificity [are im-
practicable and insistence on them can indicate] a grudging or negative attitude by re-
viewing courts toward warrants [which] will tend to discourage police officers from sub-
mitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting." United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
148. "[T]he officers who are commanded to search [must] be able from the particular
description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is proba-
ble cause to believe that a crime is being committed." United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d
324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).
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quarters."' A sound argument can be made to require particu-
larity in search warrants covering shelters such as Covenant
House.'6 0 Residents do not have access to many areas of the
complex: offices are normally not entered, and admission to
floors on which a resident does not live is prohibited.'6 ' Further-
more, each resident floor can be entered only by using a guarded
elevator or a special key. Thus, the particularity requirement
will in all likelihood require specificity to at least a floor or two.
2. Execution
The constitutional mandates over proper police entry are
"deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging
application."' 2 Historically, these entry requirements were
found to be necessary to decrease the potential for violence and
to protect privacy when warrants were executed.'6 3 As an out-
growth of this, the police are required, before using force, to give
149. LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 78.
150. An interesting question arises upon consideration of particularity and arrests.
Should the particularity clause require the police to search the complex beginning with
the most likely place to find a suspect, or should they be given free reign once legiti-
mately in the complex? On the one hand, the inherent mobility of a suspect and the
importance of flexibility in police tactics argue for no limitations. On the other hand, the
spectre of pretext searches might call for a requirement for the police to first look where
it is most likely the suspect would be. Although such a limit might make good policy, it
is hard to imagine that search procedures, imbued with tactics and uncertainties, would
be restricted by a constitutional principle.
151. For instance, there is little reason to allow residents onto the floors housing cor-
porate offices. Such a restriction would force the police to limit the scope of their
application.
152. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (Defendant's arrest was unlaw-
ful and the evidence seized inadmissible because the police officers had not expressly
demanded admission or stated the purpose for their presence before breaking down the
defendant's door).
153. The announcement rule was first stated in Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194
(K.B. 1907):
In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open)
may break the party's house either to arrest him, or to do execution of the
King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to
signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the doors. ...
Id. at 195. In Ratcliffe v. Burton, 127 Eng. Rep. 123 (C.P. 1802), Justice Rooke observed:
"What a privilege will be allowed to sheriffs' officers if they are permitted to effect their
search by violence, without making that demand which possibly will be complied with,
and consequently violence be rendered unnecessary!" Id. at 127. See generally Note, An-
nouncement in Police Entries, supra note 4; Thomas, The Execution of Warrants of
Arrest, 1962 CRIME. L. REV. 597.
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clear notice of their authority and purpose.154 In executing a
search warrant in New York, a police officer must show the occu-
pant a copy of the warrant upon request.155 As with all police
actions controlled by the fourth amendment, "the manner in
which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as
to its reasonableness." '156
The police do not have to give notice of authority and pur-
pose before entry if exigent circumstances exist. In Ker v. Cali-
fornia,157 the Supreme Court, justifying the officer's failure to
give notice, found that "[fin addition to the officers' belief that
Ker was in possession of narcotics, which could be quickly and
easily destroyed, Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them shortly
before the arrest was ground for the belief that he might well
have been expecting the police. ' 158 The Court has yet to decide
whether a blanket exception to the announcement requirement
exists for all drug cases.1
59
New York is one of a small number of jurisdictions that
have adopted legislation specifically authorizing entry without
prior announcement upon a sufficient showing to the magistrate
of a need to do so, if necessary to prevent the escape of the de-
154. N.Y. CraM. PROC. L. §§ 690.50(1), 690.50(3) (McKinney 1984). See also Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 220.3(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975).
155. Id. §§ 120.80(2), 690.50(1), 690.50(3) (McKinney 1982). See also MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 220.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1975): part of execu-
tion is requirement that service of warrant be effected before commencing search, unless
exigent circumstances exist. In that case, service of warrant can take place afterwards. In
either case, a warrant must be issued or left at the premises.
156. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979) (Federal agents' actions in co-
vertly entering defendant's office to install a court-ordered electronic surveillance device
were found not to violate fourth amendment, even though surveillance order did not
expressly authorize entry of the defendant's business).
157. 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (Officers entry and search of defendant's apartment without a
warrant was valid as incident to valid arrest based on probable cause to believe that the
defendant was involved with drugs, and the method of entry was not unreasonable).
158. Id. at 40. See also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
159. In Rodriguez v. Butler, 536 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1976), the court indicated that it
was not resolving the question of whether under Ker a reasonable belief that narcotics
are present within always justifies an unannounced entry. "New York evidently holds
that it does, [however, federal] courts interpreting the requirements of the federal ...
announcement statute ... are not in full accord on this question." Id. at 987.
For an argument against such an exception, see Note, Announcement In Police En-
tries, supra note 4, where the author argues for a requirement of a showing of articulable
facts leading to probable cause that the suspect will destroy the evidence if announce-
ment is made.
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fendant, the destruction of evidence, or harm to the executing
officer.160 Also, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
interpreted the New York provision to permit avoidance of the
notice requirement if exigent circumstances are present.161
In New York, a search warrant must be executed within 10
days of issuance, and, unless it expressly authorizes execution at
any time of day or night, it may be executed on any day of the
week only between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.1"2 An
arrest warrant may be executed at any time by any officer to
whom it is addressed or to whom the officer delegates it.16
The manner-of-entry decisions have several important im-
plications for Covenant House policy. First, barring exigent cir-
cumstances, the police must announce their authority and pur-
pose, and show a copy of the warrant. Exigent circumstances
should rarely permit waiver of these requirements. Unlike a pri-
vate home where announcement immediately puts the occupants
160. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 690.50(2) (McKinney 1984), 120.80(4) (McKinney
1981).
161. Rodriguez v. Butler, 536 F.2d 982, 985 (2d Cir. 1976), citing People v. Floyd, 26
N.Y.2d 558, 562, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195, 260 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1970), and People v.
Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 396 n.1, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 n.1, 227 N.E.2d 284, 288 n.1
(1967) (Fuld, J., dissenting) . But see People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 266
N.Y.S.2d 353, 356, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661 (1965) where the court stretched the exception to
a search for gambling equipment, without any specific showing of need. "Even though
there is nothing in the affidavit to show specifically how or where these gambling materi-
als would be likely to be destroyed or removed, the likelihood that they would be was an
inference of fact which the judge signing the warrant might draw." Id.
The New York cases indicate that a strict interpretation of the rules of entry is
applied when actual force is used to effect entry. People v. DiBernardo, 89 Misc.2d 931,
392 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Suffolk Co. Sup. Ct. 1977).
162. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. L. § 690.30 (McKinney 1984). This requirement is to protect
against the staleness of the warrant. Id. This statutory period (10 days) is an outer limit,
and a search executed inside the period may be untimely if enough time has elapsed so
that there is no longer probable cause to believe the items listed in the warrant will still
be on the premises. United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1970).
If the search warrant is issued by a district court or New York City criminal court,
or a superior court judge it can be executed anywhere in New York. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 690.20 (McKinney 1984). Arrest warrants meet the same requirements except a
warrant issued by a city, town, or village court is executable anywhere if there is written
endorsement of the local criminal court in which the arrest is to be made. Id., § 120.70
(McKinney 1981). The only court allowed to issue an arrest warrant, is that court in
which the accusatory instrument was filed. Id.
163. Id., § 120.60 (McKinney 1981). Delegation is allowed if there is reason to believe
the defendant is in a particular county other than the one in which the warrant is re-
turnable, that county has made a written endorsement, and the delegated officer is em-
ployed in the locality where the arrest is made.
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on notice, announcement to the receptionist or administrator in
charge will rarely tip off a resident whose property or person is
the subject of a warrant.
Shelters, such as Covenant House, believe that the police
should be required to show the warrant to a shelter administra-
tor, and that the administrator should be allowed an opportu-
nity to get the requested resident or item before the police come
into the shelter on their own. This is sound policy for two rea-
sons: the privacy of the residents is undisturbed, and the justifi-
cations for additional searches and seizures inside the center are
not present when the police are not legitimately inside the
center.16 4 There are no cases that hold that a police officer with a
valid warrant must show any particular occupant a copy of the
warrant, or that a police officer must allow an occupant who in-
dicates assured cooperation the right to return with the subject
of the warrant. It might be argued that under the general fourth
amendment requirement that officers conduct themselves rea-
sonably in executing a warrant, there is an obligation on the po-
lice officers to minimize the degree of intrusion necessary to find
the described items by affording the occupant an opportunity to




The issue of searches of people who are present on premises
being searched under a warrant needs mentioning. If the police
are first, legitimately in the shelter searching or arresting under
a warrant, they may want to search residents present in the
search area, but not named in the warrant. In Ybarra v. Iii-
164. See infra notes 235-61 and accompanying text.
165. See LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 186. Such an argument, based on reasonableness,
might also be of weight in resolving the conflict concerning what type of warrant the
police need in order to enter Covenant House (see supra at notes 108-38 and accompany-
ing text). With cooperation assured, it is reasonable, to minimize the intrusion, to require
the police to have at least an arrest warrant and a search warrant before they can ignore
Covenant House staff members' offers of assistance (of course this would apply only in
the absence of exigent circumstances). Cooperation by Covenant House officials can be
counted on much more than family members in a private home. Further, the likelihood
of escape is minimal given that there are only two exits from the complex.
It would certainly be helpful to inform the police beforehand that Covenant House
officials will fully cooperate upon presentation of a valid warrant. Such knowledge by the
police might increase the reasonableness of giving Covenant House staff an opportunity
to bring the subject of the warrant themselves.
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nois,"s the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois
statute allowing the police reasonably to detain and search any
person found on the premises searched under a search warrant
in order to prevent the disposal or concealment of the articles
described in the warrant. 167 Mere presence in a place searched
under warrant was insufficient to justify a search. 168 The Court
also held that traditional probable cause was the standard to be
met to justify a search of persons present on the premises being
searched under a warrant. "[A] person's mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not,
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that per-
son. . . .Where the standard is probable cause, a search or
seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause partic-
ularized with respect to the person." 169 The Court expressly re-
fused to extend the protective frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio
170
to persons who may be concealing contraband. M  The case has
important consequences for police searches at shelters such as
Covenant House. Unless shelter residents are named in the war-
rant, or qualify for a frisk under Terry, they cannot be searched
and their mere presence in the room searched under warrant is
insufficient justification for a police search of their persons.
166. 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (Police officers' warrantless pat down of all customers who
happened to be present, in an authorized search of the bar, found violative of the fourth
amendment).
167. Id. at 90-96.
168. Id. at 94-95 citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). The Court in Di
Re said it was "not convinced that a person, by mere presence ... loses immunities from
search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled." Id. at 587.
169. 444 U.S. at 91.
170. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Where police officer concluded in light of his experience, that
unusual and suspicious conduct by defendant and two others evidenced likelihood of
criminal activity, a search of their persons was reasonable under the fourth amendment).
See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Note, Criminal Law-Search of Persons Present on Premises
Subject to a Search Warrant-Ybarra v. Illinois, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 512 (1980). See also
Note, Fourth Amendment Rights of Persons Present When a Search Warrant is Exe-
cuted: Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IOWA L. REv. 453 (1981), where the author points out that
the court did not explicitly deal with the contention that a person may pose a threat
solely because of his presence in a particular group or at a particular location.
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V. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND ARRESTS
A. Exigent Circumstances
The Supreme Court has recognized that some warrantless
entries into the home to search or arrest are reasonable under
the fourth amendment. An exigent circumstance can justify such
entries and is an exception to the constitutional rule.172 The
scope and definition of this principle is highly important to an
assessment of Covenant House's rights against intrusions by the
police. It is precisely the situation of anxious warrantless police
officers demanding entrance to Covenant House that is of grav-
est concern. Not that much can be done to halt a zealous of-
ficer-calling the police seems futile171-but an understanding of
Covenant House's rights will enable prompt post-incident
action.
The exigent circumstances exception is an emergency doc-
trine. The lack of predictability of street situations makes prin-
cipled analysis and easily employable rules difficult if not impos-
sible to formulate. The necessary accommodation between the
individual's privacy interests and the promotion of effective law
enforcement meets its Goliath in the panic of ongoing crimes.
The best approach for approximating any understanding of the
exigent circumstances rule is first to examine the central cases
closely, and then to screen additional decisions to breathe life
into the various components of the rule.
1. The Doctrine
In Warden v. Hayden,174 the Supreme Court first carved
out the exigent circumstances exception. In Hayden, a cab
driver informed the police that an armed robber had entered a
172. A state must provide a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint on liberty promptly after any warrantless arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
173. It is possible that a call to a higher level police officer may allow for a more
reasoned opinion which will put a stop to the intrusion.
174. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). For sources on exigent circumstances see generally Mas-
colo, Emergency Arrest in the Home, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 387 (1981); Note, Warrant-
less Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U.
ILL. L.F. 655 (1978); Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances For A Warrantless Ar-
rest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90 (1980).
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specific house, later determined to be Hayden's home.' 75 The po-
lice arrived within five minutes, entered, seized evidence, and ar-
rested Hayden.'16 The Court held that the entry and seizures
were permissible under the Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers
to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so
would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.
Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of
the house for persons and weapons could have insured
that Hayden was the only man present and that the po-
lice had control of all weapons which could be used
against them or to effect an escape.
77
The Court in United States v. Santana7 8 outlined the "hot
pursuit" branch of the exigent circumstances exception. In
Santana, the police, after buying heroin from and arresting the
dealer, immediately went to the supplier's home two blocks
away.'7 9 Upon arrival, Santana, the supplier, was standing on
her front porch.' 80 When the police identified themselves,
Santana fled into her home, whereupon the police rushed in and
arrested her.18' During the arrest, several packets of heroin fell
from a paper sack Santana was holding. 182 The Court held the
arrest and seizure constitutionally proper as a clear case of "hot
pursuit." "[H]ot pursuit means some sort of chase, but it need
not be an extended hue and cry in and about [the] public
streets. . . .Once Santana saw the police, there was likewise a
realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction
of evidence.1 88 The case establishes the proposition that an ar-
rest set in motion in a public place (Santana's front porch, ex-
posed to public view) cannot be defeated by the expedient of
escaping to a private place.
These two cases, Hayden and Santana, provide the skeleton
175. 387 U.S. at 297.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 298-99.
178. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).




183. Id. at 43.
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of the exigent circumstances principle. A general statement of
the rule is if, to a reasonably prudent person, any delay incident
to securing a warrant would (1) pose significant risk of danger to
life or property, (2) allow the escape of the suspect, or (3) permit
destruction of evidence, then a warrantless search or seizure rea-
sonable in scope is constitutionally proper.184 This account, how-
ever, is lacking in the requisite specificity needed for application
to various possible street occurrences.
The most ambitious effort to add flesh to these bones was
undertaken by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Dorman v. United States.15 In Dorman an armed robber ab-
sconded from a clothing store wearing a stolen suit; his proba-
tion papers, which identified him by name and address, were left
behind in his pants in the store. 86 Four hours later, the police
made a warrantless entry into Dorman's home. 87 Not finding
him there, the police searched the home and found the stolen
suit hanging in the closet. 88 The court upheld the search as con-
ducted pursuant to exigent circumstances. 89 The court elabo-
rated "useful," "[non] comprehensive," "considerations," that are
"material" to ascertain those situations that cannot "brook the
delay incident to obtaining a warrant."" 90 The court's list of pos-
sible relevant requirements for the exception to apply included
(1) a grave offense is involved, (2) the suspect is reasonably be-
lieved to be armed, (3) there exists a clear showing of probable
cause, (4) a strong reason exists to believe that the suspect is in
the premises being entered, (5) there is a likelihood that the sus-
pect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, and (6) under the
circumstances the entry, though not consented, is made peacea-
bly." This list, hardly immune from criticism, 192 has been
184. The Supreme Court has not faced the issue of the duration of an emergency
search. One commentator has argued that, "upon the termination of the supporting basis
for the warrantless presence, the police must cease any further search activity and must
seek a warrant." See Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The Investigative
search and the Issue of Re-Entry, 55 N.D.L. Rav. 7, 15 (1979).
185. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
186. Id. at 387-88.
187. Id. at 388.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 392.
191. Id. at 392-93.
192. Professor LaFave expresses concern with regard to the practical utility for a po-
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adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 9
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Mitchell, 94
outlined a general guideline. In Mitchell, the police searched a
hotel for a missing chambermaid, last seen on the sixth floor.'95
The chambermaid's hacked body was found in a sixth floor
room.' 96 The court, upholding the search, recognized "the gen-
eral obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they rea-
sonably believe to be in distress."'' 9 7 The court summarized the
basic elements of the exigent circumstances exceptions:
(1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe
that there is an emergency at hand and an immedi-
ate need for their assistance for the protection of life
or property;
(2) the search must not be primarily motivated by in-
tent to arrest and seize evidence;
(3) there must be some reasonable basis, approximating
liceman forced to make a prompt decision as to whether exigent circumstances exist of
such a cumbersome test:
Finally, it is not inappropriate to suggest that the rules governing search
and seizure, including when a warrant is required, are more in need of greater
clarity than greater sophistication. Guidelines as to what constitutes "exigent
circumstances" are likely-in the long run- to be more effective in preventing
unnecessary warrantless searches and seizures if expressed in terms which the
police can easily understand and readily apply, than if developed in a more com-
plicated fashion toward the end of theoretical perfection.
LaFave, supra note 1, at 30. Professor LaFave goes on to suggest that the better proposal
is one that is "theoretically correct 95 out of 100 cases but understandable in its applica-
tion to virtually all cases," rather than one that is 100 percent theoretically perfect but
understandable to the police in only 75 percent of the cases. LaFave, supra note 1, at 30
n.76. See also Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth
Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 679 (1978) where the author added:
Indeed, the prospect of policemen checking the Dorman list to see if exigent
circumstances justify his warrantless entry seem ludicrous. If the Fourth
Amendment is to have the practical effect of safeguarding personal liberty by
regulating police procedure, an interpretation of Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness must be stated in terms readily comprehensible to the police in their day-
to-day activities.
193. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978).
194. 139 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976). See generally N.Y.
CRIM. PROc. LAW § 140 (McKinney 1981).
195. Id. at 175-76.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 177. The Court warned, however, "the limited privilege afforded to law
enforcement officials by the emergency does not give them carte blanche to rummage for
evidence if they believe a crime has been committed." Id. at 179.
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probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched. 98
2. Destruction of Evidence
The destruction of evidence was not discussed in
Dorman,199 and is clearly a critical circumstance to be consid-
ered in determining the presence of any exigency. The belief
that evidence will be destroyed is necessary before warrantless
entry is permitted, but to what degree of belief is not clear. The
goal of such a standard is not to ensure that no evidence is ever
destroyed. 200 The fact that particular kinds of evidence readily
lend themselves to destruction is not sufficient in itself to estab-
lish an exigent circumstance.
In Vale v. Louisiana,20 ' the Supreme Court held impermis-
sible a warrantless search for drugs of Vale's mother's house,0 2
even though Vale's mother and brother arrived at the scene im-
mediately after the arrest.20 3 The Court stated a strict, though
dubious, standard. "[T]he goods ultimately seized were not in
the process of destruction. Nor were they about to be removed
from the jurisdiction. '" 04 The dissent pointed out that a differ-
ent standard was formulated in the past.2 05 In Johnson v.
United States, 206 the Court declared exigent circumstances to be
present when "evidence or contraband was threatened with re-
moval. ' 07 The Vale decision indicates that the destruction of
evidence exception to the warrant requirement is to be narrowly
198. Id.
199. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
200. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
It is said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after consulting the
lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a
too permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment.
See generally Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evi-
dence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1971).
201. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
202. Id. at 33-35.
203. Id. at 33.
204. Id. at 35.
205. Id. at 39 (Black, J., dissenting).
206. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).




The courts have applied the destruction of evidence princi-
ple in a wide variety of cases: Michigan v. Tyler °0 (an entry to
fight a fire requires no warrant, and once in the building, offi-
cials may remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause
of the blaze); Schmerber v. California'0 9 (blood samples taken
by a physician at the direction of police officer of driver sus-
pected of being intoxicated is permissible without a warrant);
Cupp v. Murphy210 (scrapings of blood samples from defend-
ant's fingernails before arrest admissible); United States v.
Gomez2 ' (voices, scurrying feet, the sound of water running and
the sound of a toilet flush are sufficient for creating exigent cir-
cumstances); People v. Vaccaro'12 (reliable information that a
gun delivery was rapidly being distributed was sufficient to jus-
tify warrantless raid); United States v. Reed 21 (search by Drug
Enforcement Agency agents two and one-half months after accu-
satory information was received was impermissible without a
warrant).
3. The Presence of Weapons
The threat to the safety of the police or innocent bystanders
posed by an armed suspect creates an obvious basis for action
without a warrant. Mere possession or ownership of a dangerous
weapon, without more, will not reasonably support the belief
that the suspect poses a threat.2 14 Additionally, the seriousness
of the offense, by itself, will not justify a warrantless search.218
In People v. Etcheverry,1 6 the police received confidential
information that a fugitive named in a one year outstanding ar-
208. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
209. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
210. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
211. 633 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980).
212. 39 N.Y.2d 468, 384 N.Y.S.2d 411, 348 N.E.2d 886 (1976).
213. 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
214. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976).
215. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978). The Court held that a four-day
search of Mincey's apartment after a shootout in which Mincey had shot and killed a
narcotics agent to be impermissible, lacking the requisite exigency. The rationale that
the public interest in prompt investigation of extremely serious crimes justified the
search was rejected by the Court.
216. 39 N.Y.2d 252, 383 N.Y.S.2d 292, 347 N.E.2d 654 (1976).
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rest warrant was armed and at his mother's home.21 7 Upholding
the police search of the home, the New York Court of Appeals
identified a paint brush, hastily abandoned, as evidence that the
defendant was attempting to elude the police.2 1 8 Citing Hayden,
the court concluded that "an armed fugitive was at large within
the confines of a house, necessitating a prompt thorough search
by the police. ' 21  Similarly, in People. v. Velez, 2 ° the court
found ample justification for a warrantless arrest "of two dan-
gerous and armed robbers who had just perpetrated a felony
murder ... . In United States v. Artieri,222 the court used a
subjective-objective test to determine that "the agents making
the entry had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that




Flight is another instance that is obviously grounds for a
warrantless arrest. The mere possibility of escape, however, is
insufficient to give rise to exigent circumstances.2 In United
States v. Manning,'2 5 the court justified a search "where those
within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because,
for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then en-
gaged in activity which justifies the officer's belief that an es-
cape or destruction of evidence is being attempted. ' 226
5. Other Factors of Importance
No list of relevant factors for an emergency doctrine can be
complete. The following is a brief catalogue of criteria that has
been important in past exigent circumstances decisions:
217. Id. at 254.
218. Id. at 255.
219. Id. at 256.
220. 88 Misc.2d 378, 388 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1976).
221. Id. at 391.
222. 491 F.2d 440, 444 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974).
223. Id. at 444.
224. United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring and dis-
senting); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum).
225. 448 F.2d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
226. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
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a) Delay: Delay by itself is not controlling;2 7 securing a war-
rant always involves some delay. But the warrant process
does take time,228 and the delay involved is a circumstance
to be considered.229
b) Stakeout: Some courts have held warrantless searches im-
permissible on the ground that the police could have kept
the premises under surveillance while a warrant was ob-
tained.2 0 But a stakeout is not required if delay would
heighten risks of violence, destruction of evidence or
escape.28
c) Time of Entry: As the Dorman court pointed out, this factor
works both ways. On the one hand, the late hour may under-
score the delay. On the other hand, nighttime entries have
been seen as particularly intrusive, and may elevate the de-
gree of probable cause required before a warrantless action
can commence.
23 2
d) Probable Cause: The court in Dorman ambiguously referred
to clear probable cause.2 3  This standard has not been
picked up by other courts, but is worth watching. Belief that
a suspect is present is always a prerequisite for any warrant-
less entry.2 '
B. Legitimately on the Premises
Once a police officer is legitimately on the premises a pano-
ply of warrantless search justifications arise. The wide variety of
227. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 394 (quoting Chappell v. United States,
342 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
228. United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978) (several hours);
United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 27 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978) (between 4 and 5 hours).
229. In United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1980), the agents were
unable to locate the federal magistrate, and the nearest state judge resided approxi-
mately 55 miles away. Bad and hazardous roads caused by a continuing snowstorm made
travel impracticable.
230. United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976). Several courts have upheld warrantless entries
only after concluding that circumstances were such that surveillance was not feasible;
United States v. Cognato, 408 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn. 1976); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 375 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Texas 1974).
231. United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976) (surveillance was
possible). See also LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 49, § 6.1.
232. 435 F.2d at 393.
233. Id. at 392.
234. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
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available legal searches"' makes it crucial to exclude the police
from the premises whenever possible to protect the privacy in-
terests of the residents. This section will outline the various
rules formulated by the courts in this area of fourth amendment
law.
1. Incident to Arrest
In Chimel v. California,2" the police came to the home of
the defendant with an arrest warrant; they suspected the de-
fendant of robbing a coin shop.237 After arresting the defendant,
the police conducted a full-scale search of the defendant's three-
bedroom house and discovered the stolen coins.2 38 The Court
found the search improper because it was unnecessarily broad.239
A search incident to arrest is justified if the scope is limited to
that required to protect the safety of the arresting officer.
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate
control"-construing the phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence. There is no comparable justification,
however, for routinely searching any room . ..20
The Chimel standard, as interpreted and applied by lower
courts, has increasingly proved wanting as a meaningful restric-
tion upon the scope of a search incident to arrest. The term
"control" has often been strained by courts which have con-
doned searches despite the arrestee's obvious inaccessibility to
235. One author sees the elastic interpretation of these doctrines as effectively re-
turning us to the days when full searches were permitted whenever an arrest took place.
Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the
Property of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest On or Near Pri-
vate Premises, 30 SuP. CT. REV. 973, 988-89 (1979).
236. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
237. Id. at 753.
238. Id. at 754.
239. Id. at 768.
240. Id. at 763. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) for an articula-
tion of the rationale allowing a limited search: "[t]he potential dangers lurking in all
custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 'immediate control' area
reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weap-
ons or destructible evidence may be involved. Id. at 14-15.
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the area searched.24' "It is not at all clear that the 'grabbing dis-
tance' authorized in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the ar-
rested person's continued capacity to 'grab'. '24 2 The exception is
applicable to any situation in which a full custody arrest
occurs.
2 4 8
2. The Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine is often applied to allow the police
who are on the premises for lawful purposes to make a warrant-
less seizure of evidence which they see in plain sight. The three
requirements, as elaborated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, "
are (1) the police must legitimately be on the premises, (2) the
articles discovered must be immediately incriminating, and (3)
the discovery must be inadvertent. 2 4 The Court balanced the
policies of preventing general exploratory searches, with the effi-
cacy of allowing the police to take what they see and thus avoid
the timely and costly warrant process.
It is not clear what degree of awareness the police must
have of the likelihood of finding the object before its discovery
in plain view is no longer inadvertent.246 Professor LaFave
points out the inherent difficulty of "an after-the-fact inquiry
into what the officer intended or knew, especially when it is to
his advantage to claim a lack of such knowledge or in-
241. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 235, at 985.
242. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 508, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1973) (quoting
People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 563, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196, 260 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1970)).
243. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (where a search incident to
arrest for a traffic violation was upheld). If a Chimel search does occur, two additional
grounds are available for challenging its propriety: the legality of the underlying arrest,
and, similarly, whether the arrest was a subterfuge, made simply to afford the police an
opportunity to conduct a search.
244. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
245. Thus far only the plurality of four in Coolidge has supported the inadvertence
requirement. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plain-view doctrine elaborated).
246. The possibilities are: total surprise, negligent to see, or no probable cause for a
warrant. See also Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) regarding the "Open
Fields Doctrine" which says that open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the fourth amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance. Open fields are accessible to the public and police in ways that a
home, office or commercial structure would not be; because fences or "No Trespassing"
signs do not effectively bar public from viewing open fields, any asserted expectation of
privacy in open fields is not one that society recognizes as reasonable.
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tent .... "I" The number of "inadvertent" seizures is likely to
rise just as the number of "dropsy"""5 cases multiplied after
Mapp.
2 49
3. The Stop and Frisk
In Terry v. Ohio,2 50 the Supreme Court established the rule
that an officer, for his or her own safety and protection, may
conduct a limited patdown for weapons upon a reasonable belief
that the person to be searched is armed and presently danger-
ous, despite the lack of probable cause for either a full arrest or
a full search.2 51 The stop must be based on specific and articul-
able facts suggesting that the suspect is armed and presently
dangerous .2 52 A reasonable stop in New York allows the officer to
ask only three questions: (1) name, (2) address, and (3) explana-
tion of conduct.25' The permissible frisk involves a two-step pro-
cess. First, a patdown to feel for hard objects which may be
weapons, and secondly, reaching inside a pocket of clothing only
if a hard object is found.5 4
In Ybarra v. Illinois, 5 the Court rejected the proffered jus-
tification for the search, but, by analyzing the facts with the
Terry rationale, acknowledged the applicability of a Terry stop
and frisk at the scene of a search or arrest.2 56 Professor LaFave
has marshalled a list of relevant factors for such a stop:
Among the relevant circumstances in making an assess-
ment of the apparent danger [posed by companions of
persons arrested] are the nature of the crime for which
the arrest was made, the time and place of the arrest, the
number of officers who are present as compared to the
247. LaFave, supra note 1, at 29.
248. "Dropsy" cases are those in which the police gain probable cause upon seeing
the defendant drop the evidence. See Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Nar-
cotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRiM. LAW BULL. 549 (1968).
249. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
250. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (Reasonableness of a stop and frisk is determined by bal-
ancing the justification for the intrusion with the extent of the intrusion).
251. Id. at 21.
252. Id.
253. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1983).
254. 392 U.S. at 24.
255. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
256. Id. at 93.
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number of arrestees and companions, and whether the
companions have made any movements.2"'
4. The Protective Sweep
The emerging protective sweep doctrine enables law en-
forcement officials to conduct a cursory search of premises for
potential accomplices or allies.2 8 Like the stop and frisk and in-
cident to arrest searches, the protective sweep is grounded in the
concern for protection of police officers. The risk is most often
present at arrest, but can arise from a police entry upon private
premises to execute a search warrant.2 59 The doctrine is impor-
tant because it puts the police legitimately on the premises for
possible plain view seizures whether or not the alleged accom-
plices are discovered. The variety of situations in which the
sweep has been invoked to establish a foundation for seizure of
evidence is vast.26 Very often the courts do not identify the
standard of justification used in passing on the validity of a pro-
tective sweep. When courts do identify a standard, they require
a showing that the officers possessed a reasonable basis for the
belief that other persons on the premises posed a threat either
to the officer's physical safety, or to the destruction of
evidence.261
5. Application to Shelters such as Covenant House
Once the police are legitimately on the premises of a shelter,
a Pandora's Box is open. A protective sweep may take the police
through all the rooms on a floor, increasing the opportunity for a
plain view seizure. If police are confronted by a resident who
gives them cause for fear, they may frisk the resident. The police
may not frisk everyone they see, only those creating an articul-
able indication of danger. If a resident is arrested, the police
have the authority to search the immediate area, but this may
257. LAFAVE, supra note 49 at 120-22.
258. See generally supra note 170 and accompanying text discussing the protective
sweep doctrine.
259. People v. Sturgis, 76 Misc.2d 1053, 352 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1973).
260. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 235.
261. Id. But see Vale v. Louisiana, 99 U.S. 30 (1970), where the Court did not find
such a danger in the presence of the defendant's family.
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include drawers and bags, as well as areas in plain view.
VI. SEARCHES BY COVENANT HOUSE PERSONNEL
An important problem for Covenant House concerns estab-
lishing when staff members themselves are permitted to search
residents or their belongings. The most illuminating and rele-
vant line of cases for this purpose deals with searches by school
officials in public schools of students and students' lockers. The
treatment of the students' fourth amendment rights in these
cases presents an excellent analogy for the rights of residents as
against searches by Covenant House personnel. The comparison
is appropriate because in both schools and shelters the institu-
tion's administrative officials are responsible, and can even be
said to have a duty, to maintain order and discipline and look
after the health and welfare of shelter residents. Also, both insti-
tutional administrations are vested with powers of control, re-
straint and discipline over others, if only temporarily.
The doctrine of "state action" holds that constitutional
prohibitions are applicable only when the state is involved; ac-
tions taken by individuals in their private capacity are not regu-
lated by the Constitution.2 62 Thus, searches by shelter staff that
do not constitute state action are free from constitutional re-
straints. This article will not determine whether specific acts by
Covenant House staff are state action. The following analysis as-
sumes, arguendo, that state action is present when a search is
conducted by staff.263
262. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 n.4 (1979) where the Court as-
sumed state action was present because the telephone company acted at the request of
the police in recording the phone numbers dialed by the defendants. The Court, how-
ever, went on to hold that the defendant had no privacy interest in such information, id.
at 745-46, so this dicta is of little weight in determining where private action becomes
state action.
263. In fact, it is unlikely that acts by Covenant House staff constitute state action.
The Supreme Court has expressed a clear bias against finding actions of private organi-
zations to be state action. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (Private hospital
transferring patients not state action despite state funding, extensive state regulation
and strong state interest in the services provided); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (School for troubled adolescents not state action despite 90% public funding, de-
tailed state regulation, and public function); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (Warehouseman's summary sale of goods entrusted to him not state action even
though acts were authorized by state legislature); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 163 (1973) (Utility company terminating electric service not state action despite
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Searches by Covenant House officials within the Covenant
House complex typically arise in two ways. First, as often hap-
pens, the police come to Covenant House with a warrant, look-
ing for a person or an object. Covenant House policy is that on
such an occasion an attempt is made by the shelter administra-
tion to search for the desired person or object, while at the same
time asking the police to remain in the lounge.2e A second sce-
nario involves the situation in which Covenant House personnel
believe, without police impetus, that something is wrong and
want to investigate the situation themselves. This can include
searching lockers, rooms, suitcases, and the residents them-
selves, for weapons, drugs or stolen property. The school search
cases present direct insight into the rights of the parties in-
volved in these situations.
Putting aside the cases that hinge on the distinction be-
tween officials acting as private individuals or as government
agents, the cases involve two theoretical approaches, proprietary
interest and in loco parentis. If either of these doctrines can be
applied, the search will be validated. The two methodologies do
not compete with each other, and the cases can be organized to
portray a workable analytical model.
The theory of proprietary interest rests on the basis that
students' possession of lockers is exclusive only in relation to
other students.60 Thus, in People v. Overton266 the New York
Court of Appeals upheld a warrantless search of a student's
locker by police detectives pursuant to the consent of a high
school vice-principal.67 The court used an expectation of pri-
vacy analysis to validate the search.
its monopoly status, public importance and complex state regulations); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Racially discriminating club receiving state liquor li-
cense not subject to state action).
264. Since no consent is given by Covenant House to a search by the police, the po-
lice, while waiting in the lounge, are not legitimately on the premises for the purpose of
searching. See supra notes 235-61 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 41-55
and accompanying text for a discussion of consent to searches, and supra notes 108-38
and accompanying text on the necessity of a warrant.
265. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, where a hotel guest was held to have an
expectation of privacy not only from other guests and strangers, but also from the man-
agement of the hotel.
266. 20 N.Y.2d 360, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
267. A federal district court subsequently rejected defendant's claim for post convic-
tion relief. Overton v. Rieger, 311 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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When Overton was assigned his locker, he, like all the
other students at Mount Vernon High School, gave the
combination to his home room teacher who, in turn, re-
turned it to an office where it was kept on file. The stu-
dents at Mount Vernon are well aware that the school
authorities possess the combinations of their lockers.268
This rationale might be used to support searches of residents'
rooms by Covenant House personnel. Just as students know that
school authorities have the combinations to their lockers, Cove-
nant House residents are perfectly aware that the administra-
tion has keys to their rooms. This line of reasoning, however, has
its limits. For instance, this reasoning would most likely not al-
low for a search of a resident's suitcase, which in no way has





The in loco parentis doctrine is at once stronger and weaker
than the proprietary interest rule. The theory is that school offi-
cials take the place of parents with regard to the education and
protection of the students, and that in assuming the parental
role school officials are vested with the powers of control, re-
straint and discipline over the children which parents have, in
order to protect the educational process and the health and
morals of the students.27 0 This doctrine is stronger than the pro-
prietary interest theory because it allows for searches of the per-
son and all belongings; within school bounds there are not auto-
268. 20 N.Y.2d at 363, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25. But see Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1971), where the Dean of Men at Troy State University was not accorded the
same privilege.
269. In People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974), the court of ap-
peals distinguished Overton as a right to privacy case in which school authorities had
retained extensive control.
270. The court in People v. Jackson, 65 Misc.2d 909, 911, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733
(App. Term 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1971) stated:
A school official, standing in loco parentis to the children entrusted to his
care, has, inter alia, the long honored obligation to protect them while in his
charge, so far as possible, from harmful and dangerous influences, which cer-
tainly encompasses the bringing to school by one of them of narcotics and
"works", whether for sale to other students or for administering such to himself
or other students . ...
But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), where the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that, in view of "publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies," id. at 336, it
was more proper to look at school officials as state actors rather than in loco parentis.
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matic limits. The in loco parentis doctrine is weaker because the
right to search is not automatic; the fourth amendment is held
to create some, though not full, protection.
In People v. Scott D.,271 the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated a search by a school teacher of a seventeen year old
student for drugs.2 " The court was quick to hold that instruc-
tors273 do not possess all parental prerogatives274 and that
"[h]igh school students are protected from unreasonable
searches. 2 7 5 Just as rapidly, however, the court qualified this
protection by lowering the standard of probable cause needed to
initiate a search.
[O]n the other hand, particular conditions change the ba-
sis for probable cause and therefore the standard of rea-
sonableness of searches and seizures under constitutional
limitations. . . . Youngsters in a school, for their own
sake, as well as that of their age peers in the school may
not be treated with the same circumspection required
outside the school or to which self-sufficient adults are
entitled.Y
The court recognized that "[g]iven the special responsibility of
school teachers . . . and the grave threat of drug abuse among
school children, the basis for finding sufficient cause for a school
search will be less than that required outside the school
precincts."
2 77
The standard for delineating permissible from impermissi-
ble searches seems to be whether there was "reasonable suspi-
cion" 278 to conduct the search. This vague degree of cause is not
271. 34 N.Y.2d 483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
272. Id. at 491, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
273. Id. at 486, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
274. Id. at 485, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 405. Note also that the court in People v. Bowers, 77
Misc.2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Term 1974), held that the doctrine of in loco
parentis did not extend to security guards.
275. 34 N.Y.2d at 488, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
276. Id. at 486-87, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
277. Id.
278. People v. Bowers, 77 Misc.2d at 699, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 434, quoting People v.
Jackson, 65 Misc.2d at 911, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733: "As such, the courts have held that it
would not be 'unreasonable or unwarranted that he [a coordinator of discipline] be per-
mitted to search the person of a student where the school official has reasonable suspi-
cion that narcotics may be found on the person of his juvenile charge.'"
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all that helpful. At this point we know that it calls for less proof
than "probable cause", but does not permit random causeless
searches.27 9 Among the factors that may be material are "the
child's age, history and record in the school, the prevalence and
seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was
directed, and, of course, the exigency to make the search without
delay. '280 If Covenant House staff members are aware of articul-
able facts leading them reasonably to believe a resident is in
possession of weapons, drugs or other items that could be dan-
gerous, the in loco parentis doctrine will support a search of the
resident.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of fourth amendment case law makes appli-
cation of the underlying principles of the fourth amendment to
concrete situations extremely difficult. The importance, however,
of privacy and security to homeless people, indeed, the impor-
tance of privacy and security to all of us, makes it incumbent
upon us to understand these complex rules and to be vigilant
and forceful in asserting the rights of homeless people. This arti-
cle has attempted to delineate the fourth amendment rights of
residents of shelters for the homeless, and the obligations im-
posed by the fourth amendment on the shelters and the police.
May it help protect the peace and privacy of shelter residents
when combined with strong advocacy.
279. See People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d at 487, n.31, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 406, n.31.
280. 34 N.Y.2d at 489, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
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